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Abstract— Directional wireless power transfer (WPT) technol-
ogy provides a promising energy solution to remotely recharge
the Internet of things sensors using directional antennas. Under
a harvest-then-transmit protocol, the access point can adaptively
allocate the transmit power among multiple energy directions to
maximize the social welfare of the sensors, i.e., downlink sum
received energy or uplink sum rate, based on full or quantized
channel gains reported from the sensors. However, such power
allocation can be challenged if each sensor belongs to a different
agent and works in a competitive way. In order to maximize their
own utilities, the sensors have the incentives to falsely report their
channel gains, which unfortunately reduces the social welfare.
To tackle this problem, we design the strategy-proof mechanisms
to ensure that each sensor’s dominant strategy is to truthfully
reveal its channel gain regardless of other sensors’ strategies.
Under the benchmark full channel gain reporting (CGR) scheme,
we adopt the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to derive
the price functions for both downlink and uplink, where the
truthfulness is guaranteed by asking each sensor to pay the social
welfare loss of all other sensors attributable to its presence. For
the 1-bit CGR scheme, the problem is more challenging due
to the severe information asymmetry, where each sensor has
true valuation of full channel gain but may report the false
information of quantized channel gain. We prove that the classic
VCG mechanism is no longer truthful and then propose two
threshold-based price functions for both downlink and uplink,
where the truthfulness is ensured by letting each sensor pay
its own achievable utility improvement due to its participation.
The numerical results validate the truthfulness of the proposed
mechanism designs.
Index Terms— Directional wireless power transfer, limited
channel feedback, game theory, mechanism design, dominant-
strategy incentive-compatibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS INTERNET of things (IoT) [1] is attracting moreattentions nowadays, the application of wireless sen-
sor network is of great research interest. Wireless power
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transfer (WPT) technology provides an alternative solution to
prolong the lifetime of energy-limited wireless devices [2],
where the energy transmitter, e.g., hybrid access points
(APs) or power beacons, can recharge the remote wireless
sensor nodes (SNs) via electromagnetic waves.
Since the RF signals decay quickly over distance, it is not
energy efficient to omni-directionally broadcast energy in all
directions. Directional WPT can increase the energy transfer
efficiency by concentrating the RF energy to the directions
of one or more sensors via energy beamforming [2]–[5],
with the aid of multiple antennas or directional antennas.
To achieve efficient power allocation, it is essential for the
AP to know the channel power gain of each SN. The AP
can obtain channel gain via channel training, i.e., each SN
evaluates the channel gain from the pilot signal sent by
the AP and then it reports the channel gain to the energy
transmitter on the reverse link [6]–[9]. To reduce the feedback
load and energy consumption, the SNs can feed the channel
gain into a quantizer and return only a small number of bits
to the transmitter, e.g., 1-bit feedback [11], [12]. One basic
assumption of the aforementioned literature is that the SNs
honestly follow the prescribed feedback protocols to report
their true valuations of the channel gain to the AP. This works
well for a single operator system but can be challenged in a
self-interested system. For future IoT systems, the intelligent
SNs may belong to different service providers and work
in a selfish and competitive manner. In order to optimize
its own utility, the SN may have the incentive to falsely
report its private channel gain to the AP. This false-reporting
behavior, in return, can deviate the resource allocation from
the desired optimal outcome and reduce the social welfare of
the SNs.
We adopt mechanism design theory to offset the false-
reporting incentives of the SNs. Mechanism design [13], also
known as reverse game theory, designs the payoff struc-
ture (i.e., price functions) to map the individual strategies
of the rational players to the desired global outcome [14].
A mechanism is truthful (also named as incentive compatible)
if each player maximizes its utility by disclosing its true
private type (e.g., reporting the true valuation of channel
gain to the AP) under such payoff structure. The stronger
degree of truthful mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive
compatibility (also called strategy-proofness), where truth-
telling is a weakly dominant strategy for each player that
earns a payoff no worse than any other strategies, regardless
of the other SNs’ strategies. The equilibrium in such a game is
called a dominant-strategy equilibrium. In game theory, there
0090-6778 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Maynooth University Library. Downloaded on February 23,2021 at 17:02:44 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
WANG et al.: TRUTHFUL MECHANISM DESIGN FOR WIRELESS POWERED NETWORK WITH CGR 7967
is another term named Nash equilibrium is defined as the set
of strategies for all the players such that no player can increase
its utility (or payoff) by changing its strategy while others are
playing according to their Nash equilibrium strategies. The
most important dominant-strategy truthful mechanism is the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism by Vickrey [15],
Clarke [16], and Groves [17]. Holmstrom (1979) shows that,
if the type space is smoothly connected, the VCG mechanism
is the only direct mechanism that achieve both efficiency
and strategy-proofness [18]. The VCG mechanism has been
recently applied in wireless communications networks (e.g., ad
hoc routing [19], wireless caching [20], spectrum trading [21]
networks) to ensure that the agents truthfully reveal their
private valuations, where the network resources (e.g., spectrum
bandwidth) are treated as the divisible private good. For WPT
system, the RF energy in each energy direction is a non-
exclusive non-rival public good, which is different from the
traditional applications.
A. Contribution of This Work
In this work, we focus on designing the mechanisms in
a directional WPT network that achieves both efficiency and
dominant-strategy truthfulness. We consider a harvest-then-
transmit protocol, where the AP directionally transfers RF
energy to the self-interested SNs in the downlink based on their
reported channel gains, and then the SNs use the harvested
energy to perform sensing tasks or transmit the information
back to the AP in the uplink. We consider two channel gain
reporting (CGR) schemes: full CGR and 1-bit CGR, where
the SNs feed back the full or binary channel gains to the
AP, respectively. The AP, as the mechanism designer, aims
to achieve the optimal power allocation that maximizes the
social welfare of the SNs (i.e., the downlink sum received
energy or uplink sum rate) based on the reported channel
gains. The SNs, as the game players, target at finding the
optimal strategies (i.e., reported channel gains) to maximize
their own utilities under the power allocation and payoff
structure (i.e., price function) designed by the AP. Since the SN
and AP may have conflicting objectives, we need to design the
truthful mechanism to align the local interests of the SNs with
the global objective of the AP so that the truthful CGR is the
dominant strategy of each SN and the corresponding social
welfare is maximized. Moreover, we also have to guarantee
each SN is individual rational, where no SN has negative utility
and no SN gets worse off by participating in the game.
We face two major challenges in the mechanism design for
directional WPT system. The first challenge is that, due to
the multicast nature of directional WPT, the RF energy is
not only a public good but also a private good. On the one
hand, the RF energy within the same energy beam direction
is a non-exclusive and non-rival public good, which means
we cannot exclude one SN from free-riding on the wireless
energy that is initially transmitted to another SN within the
same energy direction. From this perspective, each SN may
have the incentive to under-report its channel gain in order
to free-ride on other SNs, i.e., to receive free energy without
paying the proper price. On the other hand, the RF energy
across different energy beam directions is an exclusive and
rival private good, where increasing the energy allocated to
one sector will reduce that allocated to other sectors. From
this point of view, each SN may have the incentive to over-
report its channel gain in order to win more energy over the
competing SNs that are inside different energy directions. The
dual property of the RF energy makes the mechanism design
challenging. The second challenge is that the information is
asymmetric between the AP and the SNs. The SNs have the
exact knowledge of their private channel gains while the AP
only receives the reported channel gain or even the quantized
channel gains that partially reflect the private information. The
VCG mechanism can be applied to the full CGR case as the
type space is continuous. However, the mechanism design with
1-bit CGR is challenging due to the discrete type space and
the classical VCG mechanism may not work.
We summarize our key contributions as follows.
• Optimal power allocation for the social welfare max-
imization: Under both CGR schemes, we derive the
optimal power allocation for the directional WPT system
to maximize the social welfare of all SNs, i.e., downlink
sum received energy or uplink sum rate. Without any
price function, we show that the SNs are not truthful in
the Nash equilibrium under such power allocation, which
reduces the corresponding social welfare.
• Dominant-strategy truthful mechanism with full CGR: For
full CGR scheme, we adopt the VCG mechanism to
design the price functions to ensure that truthful reporting
is the dominant strategy for each SN. The truthfulness
is guaranteed by asking each SN to pay the externality,
i.e., the social welfare loss of all other SNs due to its
participation. For the downlink truthful mechanism, each
SN pays the amount of price that equals the reduction of
the sum received energy of all other SNs. For the uplink
truthful mechanism, an SN pays a non-zero price if it is
the critical SN that reduces the water-level of the water-
filling power allocation, where the price equals the sum
rate reduction of all other SNs.
• Dominant-strategy truthful mechanism with 1-bit CGR:
For 1-bit CGR scheme, we prove that the VCG mech-
anism is not truthful, where the SNs can still improve
their utilities by falsely reporting the quantized channel
gain. To tackle this problem, we propose two novel
threshold-based price functions for the downlink and
uplink mechanisms, respectively, to ensure that each
SN’s dominant strategy is to truly reveal whether its
channel gain is above a certain threshold. The truthfulness
is guaranteed by asking each SN to pay the internal-
ity, i.e., the improvement of its own achievable utility
attributable to its presence. For the downlink truthful
mechanism, each SN pays the amount of price that equals
the extra achievable energy received by itself. For the
uplink truthful mechanism, each SN pays the amount
of price that equals the achievable rate received by
itself.
To our best knowledge, this work is the first attempt on the
dominant-strategy truthful mechanism design for the direc-
tional WPT system.
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B. Related Work
Some recent work in [22]–[27] analyze the strategic interac-
tions among selfish and competitive decision makers in wire-
less powered networks from a game-theoretic view. In [22],
Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution of the bidding
strategies in an energy auction game, where the nodes compet-
itively bid for the RF energy from the energy transmitter and
each pays a price proportional to its bid. [23] and [24] study
two energy trading games, where [23] considers a Stackelberg
game that one data AP purchases RF energy from several
energy transmitters to recharge its sensor device and [24]
considers an ascending-bid auction that multiple data APs pur-
chase energy from one energy transmitter [24]. The work [25]
extends [23] by considering imperfect channel information
between the energy transmitter and the sensors is available
at the data AP. However, [22]–[25] have the assumption that
each node truthfully discloses its private information (e.g., the
energy costs/requests or channel gains) to the resource allo-
cator. Without this assumption, the equilibrium obtained in
these schemes may deviate from the social optimality. The
work [26] proposes an indirect Nash mechanism in the omni-
directional WPT scenario, where the users truthfully reveal
their marginal utility (not the direct utility functions) to the
energy transmitter when the decisions of all users converge
to the Nash equilibrium. In [27], contract theory is adopted
to establish the optimal contract between an data AP and
several energy transmitters to maximize the data AP’s expected
throughput under the incentive compatible constraints at the
energy transmitters.
Our work differs from the aforementioned literature in the
following points. First, different from the indirect mechanisms
adopted in [26] and [27], our work adopts a direct mecha-
nism to derive the closed-form price function that guarantees
truthful-reporting is the dominant strategy of each player in
every realization regardless of other players’ strategies, where
dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility is the most desirable
and strongest concept of truthful mechanism. Second, in our
directional WPT framework, the RF energy is not only a public
good but also a private good, where the RF energy is treated as
a public good in [26] and as a private good in [22]–[25], [27].
Both the free-riding and competing incentives of the SNs
make our mechanism design problem more challenging. Third,
to save the feedback load and energy consumption, we con-
sider a practical 1-bit CGR scheme that has not been addressed
in any of the previous WPT mechanism design works. The
false-reporting of the quantized channel gain causes a more
severe information asymmetry problem, where the truthful
mechanism design with limited private information is an open
problem itself.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the system model of the directional WPT with
full CGR and 1-bit CGR. In Section III and Section IV,
we design the dominant-strategy truthful mechanisms under
the two CGR schemes for both downlink and uplink. Numeri-
cal results are shown and discussed in Section V to validate the
truthfulness of the mechanisms. Finally, we draw conclusions
in Section VI.
Fig. 1. System model for directional WPT with CGR. Based on the channel
gains reported from the self-interested SNs, the AP adaptively allocates the
RF energy among the multiple sectors in the downlink during τ , and then
the SNs perform sensing tasks or transmit information back to the AP in the
uplink during T − τ . The example is given for N = 4.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Wireless Powered System With Channel Gain Reporting
We consider a wireless powered network consisting of an
AP and L SNs, where the AP adaptively recharges the SNs
inside its cell using directional antennas based on the reported
channel gains from the SNs. As the directional WPT can
significantly improve the energy transfer efficiency compared
with the omnidirectional WPT, we consider a similar direc-
tional WPT scenario to our previous work in [4], where the
AP is equipped with directional antennas (e.g., horn antennas)
that can form energy beams in multiple directions. We divide
the circular cell equally into N non-overlapping sectors φn
(n ∈ ZN = {1, 2 · · · , N}) and the AP located at the cell
center is able to form an energy beam in the direction of each
intended sector.1 Different from [4], the AP does not simply
allocate power equally to all intended sectors but adjusts the
power intensity based on the reported channel gains from the
SNs. A frame-based protocol is shown in Fig. 1. The AP first
obtains channel gains of the SNs via channel training and
feedback. And then we adopt the harvest-and-then transmit
protocol for energy/information transfer.
We denote Kn as the number of SNs fall inside the sector φn
in a time frame and denote the SNs that are within this sector
by SNn,k (k ∈ ZKn = {1, 2, · · · , Kn}). We may consider the
SNs follow a Binomial point process, where a fixed number
of L SNs are located randomly and independently inside the
cell. In this setup, the users’ locations are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) so that the resource allocation
in later sections is fair (i.e., each sensor is equally likely to
be served) from a long-term perspective. The main results
and analysis do not depend on any specific point process.
We assume the locations of the SNs are static within each
time frame and can be different across the time frames.
We denote the channel power gains between the AP and SNn,k
by hn,k which includes both large-scale fading (due to path
loss and shadowing) and small-scale fading (due to reflection
and diffraction). The small-scale fading channels are assumed
to be reciprocal in the uplink and downlink and follow i.i.d.
1For the ease of analysis, we ignore the side lobes and assume the radiated
energy is uniformly distributed across the main lobe of each energy beam [4]
and assume the sectorization is ideal.
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quasi-static flat fading, which are constants within each time
frame.
For efficient power allocation, it is important for the AP
to know the instantaneous channel information via channel
training and feedback [9], [28]. At the beginning of each
time frame, the AP broadcasts a dedicated training sequence
(known to the SNs) with equal power allocation among
the sectors. By receiving the training sequence, each SNn,k
estimates the channel gain hn,k. We consider the coherence
interval and time frame are large enough so that the training
process takes a negligible fraction of the total time in each
block and essentially perfect channel state estimates can be
obtained at the SNs [6], [10]. One can also adopt a fixed
time duration for this feedback process, which will not change
the main results on the mechanism design. After the channel
estimation, the SNs report the full or 1-bit quantized channel
gain to the AP through orthogonal and error-free feedback
channels.2 In this work, we consider that the SNs may belong
to different service providers, where each self-interested SNn,k
may report a different channel gain from its true valuation.
1) Full CGR: First, we consider the benchmark scenario
that the SNs send full knowledge of channel gains to the
AP, where the reported channel gain for SNn,k is denoted as
h̃n,k. For tractable analysis, we assume hmax (with sufficiently
large value) as an upper bound for both the channel gain
and reported channel gain throughout the paper. We define
h̃n,k = hn,k, h̃n,k < hn,k and h̃n,k > hn,k as truthful
reporting, under-reporting and over-reporting, respectively.
2) 1-Bit CGR: Second, we consider a more practical sce-
nario where the SNs only report the quantized channel gain,
i.e., 1-bit channel gain, to reduce the energy and bandwidth
consumption. The channel gain is quantized into two regions,
i.e., [0, γ) and [γ, hmax), where γ is the channel quantization
threshold. After the channel training, each SNn,k determines




0, if hn,k ∈ [0, γ)
1, if hn,k ∈ [γ, hmax). (1)
And then SNn,k reports the binary indicator b̃n,k to the AP,
where “b̃n,k = 0” or “b̃n,k = 1” indicates whether its channel
gain is below or above the threshold, respectively.3 If b̃n,k = 0
while its true valuation is bn,k = 1, we say SNn,k is under-
reporting. Similarly, we say SNn,k over-reports if b̃n,k = 1
while its true valuation is bn,k = 0.
After receiving the reported channel gain h̃n,k or b̃n,k from
the SNs, we adopt a harvest-then-sense/transmit protocol for
the energy/information transfer processes. Each time frame
2We assume the energy used for channel reporting is small, e.g., the energy
used for 1-bit feedback is negligible [11], which can be either supported by
a dedicated battery or recharged by the AP periodically with short broadcast
pulses. Furthermore, we assume the channel gain reporting is error-free [11],
which can be well approximated via the use of sufficiently powerful error
control codes over the feedback link [29]. It would be also interesting to
investigate the measurement errors in the channel reporting process, which
however, are beyond the scope of this paper. The focus of this work is to
prevent the subjective false-reporting incentives of SNs.
3From the long-term energy saving perspective, we may also let the SNs
be silent if b̃n,k = 0.
T is divided into two phases: energy transfer phase τ and
sensing/transmit phase T − τ [3], [30]. During τ , the AP
directionally transmits wireless energy to the SNs based on
the reported channel gains and each SN temporarily stores the
harvested energy in a capacitor.4 During T − τ , the SNs use
the harvested energy to perform sensing tasks or to report the
information back to the AP with best effort. Since capacitor
can be charged and discharged quickly and can only store
energy for a short period of time, we consider the energy
in the capacitor is used up within the current time frame and
cannot be carried forward to the next frame [4]. In Sections III
and IV, we will discuss the optimal power allocation to each
sector/SN according to the different social welfare maximiza-
tion objectives and the corresponding price function designs
that ensure the truthfulness of channel reporting.
B. Game Components and Mechanism Design
We formulate the game components as follows. The SNs
are the players each has a private channel gain hn,k that is
hidden from the AP. The strategy of each SNn,k is to report
the channel gain to the AP, i.e., h̃n,k for full CGR or b̃n,k
for 1-bit CGR, under different reporting schemes. We assume
all self-interested SNs are non-cooperative and rational with
the aim of maximizing its own utility, i.e., downlink received
energy or uplink rate. Based on the reported channel gains,
the AP with total transmit power Ptot allocates power Pn to
the direction of each sector φn to maximize the social welfare,
i.e., sum received energy or sum rate of all SNs.5 Since the
SNs are selfish, they may not report their true valuations of the
channel gains to the AP. In Sections III and IV, we will show
that the SNs have the incentives to dishonestly report their
channel gains, which deviates the power allocation of the AP
from the optimal solution and thus reduces the social welfare.
To offset this false-reporting incentive, the AP therefore has
to charge a price Cn,k from each SNn,k for providing the
resources of energy or time. We consider the AP as a non-profit
public service provider which aims at efficiently allocating the
resources to maximize the social welfare of the SNs instead
of maximizing its own revenue. To ensure that each user
truthfully reveals its private channel gain, the AP charges a
certain price from each SN in forms of virtual credit [19], [20].
We consider the SNs are price takers and they can only affect
their payment via the reported channel gains.
To give a brief picture first, we describe the interaction
between the AP and SNs in Fig. 2. Each SNn,k targets at
finding the best reporting strategy h̃n,k (or b̃n,k) that max-
imizes its own utility Un,k(hn,k, Pn, Cn,k) under the power
allocation Pn and price function Cn,k designed by the AP. The
AP, as the mechanism designer has two goals: (1) to obtain
the power allocation Pn for each sector φn that maximizes
the social welfare, i.e., sum received energy or sum rate of
all SNs; (2) to design the price function Cn,k that ensures the
4We assume the energy storage of the capacitors is sufficiently large
(e.g., supercapacitors), where the SNs can use as much power as it receives
in a time frame.
5Since the channel power gains (including both large-scale and small-scale
fading) between the AP and users are i.i.d, each user are equally likely to be
served from an average perspective and the scheme is fair in a long run.
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Fig. 2. System diagram of mechanism design for directional WPT.
truthful reporting (i.e., h̃n,k = hn,k or b̃n,k = bn,k) is the
dominant strategy for each SNn,k.
III. TRUTHFUL MECHANISM DESIGN FOR DOWNLINK
SUM ENERGY MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we consider the scenario that the SNs harvest
energy from the AP during τ and then use up the harvested
energy to perform the sensing tasks during T − τ with best
effort. We design the dominant-strategy truthful mechanism for
the full CGR and 1-bit CGR schemes under the optimal power
allocation for the downlink sum energy maximization. We first
derive the optimal power allocation of the AP to maximize
the downlink sum received energy at the SNs. Then, we show
that the SNs are not truthful at the Nash equilibrium under
such power allocation. Finally, we design the price functions to
ensure that truthful CGR is the dominant strategy for each SN.
In the downlink energy transfer slot τ , the AP allocates
the amount of power Pn (Pn ≥ 0) to the direction of
the sector φn (n = 1, 2, · · · , N ) out of the total transmit
power Ptot based on the reported channel gains. By receiv-
ing h̃n,k or b̃n,k from each SNn,k, the AP evaluates
the received energy Wn,k(h̃n,k, Pn) or achievable received
energy6 Wn,k(b̃n,kγ, Pn) at SNn,k, i.e.,
Wn,k(h̃n,k, Pn) =
{
τδh̃n,kPn, for full CGR
τδb̃n,kγPn, for 1-bit CGR,
(2)
where δ is the product of the directional antenna gain and
the energy conversion efficiency.7 To obtain tractable results,
we adopt the linear energy harvesting model [2], [31], where
the harvested DC power at the SN is proportional to the input
RF power. For low received power regime (e.g., less than
10 mW), the linear energy harvesting model gives a good
approximation to the more practical non-linear model [32].
We denote the sum of SNs’ reported channel gains in the sector
φn with full CGR by αn =
∑
k∈ZKn h̃n,k and that with 1-bit
CGR by βn =
∑
k∈ZKn b̃n,k. From the AP’s view, the sum
of received energy/achievable received energy at all SNs with
6Throughout the paper, we use the term “achievable” to describe the
effective energy/rate of the SNs from the AP’s perspective for 1-bit CGR.
Here, the channel gain is taken as γ when b̃n,k = 1 or 0 when b̃n,k = 0,
respectively.
7We assume the noise power at each SN is not taken into account for the
harvested energy.











Pnβn, for 1-bit CGR.
(3)
A. Optimal Power Allocation for Downlink
Sum Energy Maximization
In this section, we consider the scenario that the SNs use
up the harvested energy during τ to perform the sensing tasks
during T − τ with best effort. In P1 defined below, the AP
aims to optimally allocate power to each sector so that the
sum received energy for all SNs is maximized under the total







Pn ≤ Ptot (5)
Pn ≥ 0. (6)
P1 is a linear programming problem, where the solution is at
the boundary of the feasible region. Here we consider the AP
has directional antenna, where a similar problem with MIMO
setup was solved in [2]. In P1, we arrange the sum of the
reported channel gain in each sector in ascending order and
denote the highest value as α(N) = maxn∈ZN{αn} for the
full CGR and β(N) = maxn∈ZN{βn} for the 1-bit CGR.
We include the possibility of ties by considering that the sum
of reported CGR for different sectors can be the same (e.g., we
may have αi = αj for i = j). We consider the AP equally
allocates the power to all sectors in a tie. Basically, using a
different tie-breaking rule (e.g., either chooses one user or a
subset of users as the winners) will not change the main
conclusion about the truthfulness as long as the players are
indifferent and the winner is randomly selected. By solving







, if αn = α(N) for full CGR
or βn = β(N) for 1-bit CGR
0, if αn < α(N) for full CGR
or βn < β(N) for 1-bit CGR,
(7)
where M ≥ 1 is the number of sectors with the sum of
reported channel gain equals α(N) (or β(N)). In (7), the AP
divides the total energy among those sectors that have the
highest sum of reported channel gains.
B. Nash Equilibrium and Downlink Price Function
In this subsection, we first discuss the Nash equilibrium of
the self-interested SNs when no price is paid to the AP for
energy receiving. By showing the SNs have untruthful report-
ing incentives, we then introduce the price function and the
design criteria of the dominant-strategy truthful mechanism.
As SNn,k has the knowledge of true channel gain hn,k, its
true valuation of received energy is
Wn,k(hn,k, Pn) = τδhn,kPn, for n ∈ Zn and k ∈ ZKn , (8)
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Under the AP’s power allocation in (7), each self-interested
SNn,k chooses its optimal reporting strategy to maximize its
received energy. For full CGR, we have
P2 : max
h̃n,k
Wn,k(hn,k, P ∗n(h̃n,k)) (9)
s.t. h̃n,k ∈ [0, hmax], (10)
and for 1-bit CGR we replace h̃n,k by b̃n,kγ in P2, where
b̃n,k ∈ {0, 1}. Based on (7), P ∗n is non-decreasing with the
increase of h̃n,k or b̃n,k. In order to increase the received
energy, each SNn,k has the incentive to over-report. By solving
P2, the Nash equilibrium with full CGR is h̃∗n,k = hmax and
that with 1-bit CGR is b̃∗n,k = 1 ∀n, k. However, this Nash
equilibrium is not efficient. One can easily check that the
false-reporting in the Nash equilibrium can lead to substantial
decrease of the sum received energy compared with that of
the truthful reporting.
To offset the over-reporting incentives of the SNs, the AP
charges a price Cn,k from each SNn,k as a cost for receiving




Wn,k(hn,k, P ∗n(h̃n,k)) − Cn,k, for full CGR,
Wn,k(hn,k, P ∗n(b̃n,k)) − Cn,k, for 1-bit CGR.
(11)




Un,k(hn,k, P ∗n(h̃n,k)) (12)
s.t. h̃n,k ∈ [0, hmax] (13)
for full CGR. And for 1-bit CGR we replace h̃n,k by b̃n,kγ
in P3, where b̃n,k ∈ {0, 1}. In the following two subsections,
we will design the price function Cn,k for each SN to ensure
that truthful reporting (i.e., h̃n,k = hn,k for full CGR and
b̃n,k = bn,k for 1-bit CGR) is the dominant strategy for each
SN in P3.
C. Downlink Price Function Design With Full CGR
In this subsection, we design the price function for downlink
sum energy maximization with full CGR. Based on the power
allocation in (7), only the sectors that have the highest sum of
reported channel gains receive non-zero power allocation from
the AP. A straightforward pricing scheme is the proportional
pricing scheme. Similar to [22], we can let each SN pay a price
that is proportional to its reported channel gain. However, due
to the non-exclusive and non-rival property of the wireless
energy, the SNs may have the incentive to under-report their
channel gains under such pricing scheme in order to free ride
on other users within the same sector.
In order to guarantee each SN truthfully reports its channel
gain, we now adopt the VCG mechanism to derive the price
functions. The key idea of the VCG mechanism is that each
SN pays the “externality” it imposes on all other SNs due to
its participation, where the “externality” is the change of the
social welfare (e.g., sum received energy or sum rate) for the
rest of the SNs in the system. For downlink energy transfer
scheme, the participation of SNn,k may improve the energy
of the SNs that are also within sector φn and reduce that of
the SNs in other sectors. By adopting the VCG mechanism,
SNn,k pays the difference between the sum received energy
of all other SNs (both intra-sector and inter-sector) under the










Wi,j(h̃i,j , P ∗i (h̃n,k)), (14)
where P ∗∗i and P
∗
i (given in (7)) are the optimal power
allocations for the sector φi without and with the participation
of SNn,k, respectively.
Theorem 1: For full CGR, the VCG price in (14) ensures
that truthful reporting of h̃n,k = hn,k is the dominant strategy
for each SNn,k in P3 under the power allocation in P1.
Proof: See Appendix A.
We now derive P ∗∗i in (14) as follows. Without the partic-












Pi ≤ Ptot (16)
Pi ≥ 0. (17)
We denote the sum of reported channel gains of the rest of the
SNs in the sector φn as α̂n = αn − h̃n,k. We rearrange the
sum of the reported channel gains α1, α2, · · · , α̂n, · · · , αN in
ascending order and denote the new highest value among them
as α̂(N) = maxi∈ZN {αi=n, α̂n}. Similar to P1, the optimal
power allocation for P4 is to equally allocate the total power
Ptot to the M̂ sectors (M̂ ≥ 1) that each has the sum of the






, if αi = α̂(N) for i = n
or α̂i = α̂(N) for i = n,
0, if αi < α̂(N) for i = n
or α̂i < α̂(N) for i = n.
(18)
By substituting P ∗i in (7) and P
∗∗
i in (18) into Cn,k in (14),





Wi,j(hi,j , P ∗∗i ) = τδPtotα̂(N)
=
{
τδPtotα(N), if αn < α(N)
τδPtotα̂(N), if αn = α(N)
(19)
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, if αn =α(N) and α̂n <α̂(N)
τδPtotα̂(N), if αn =α(N) and α̂n = α̂(N).
(20)
From (19) and (20), we observe that the participation of SNn,k
changes the sum of received energy of all other SNs only if
αn = α(N) and α̂n < α̂(N) hold at the same time, which
means the sum of the reported channel gains in the sector φn
is not the highest among all sectors unless SNn,k participates.
Substituting (19) and (20) into (14), the price function for
SNn,k is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Under the optimal power allocation for






α̂(N) − α(N) + h̃n,k
M
]
, if αn = α(N)
and α̂n < α̂(N)
0, otherwise.
(21)
ensures that truthful-reporting of the full CGR (i.e., h̃n,k =
hn,k) is the dominant strategy for each SNn,k in P3. And
each SN is individual rational under this VCG price.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 1: Based on Proposition 1, if SNn,k is the critical
SN that changes the power allocation due to its participa-
tion, the price it pays equals to the change in the sum
received energy of all other SNs, which includes both the
increased energy of the other SNs within the sector φn and the
reduced energy of SNs in all other sectors. Adopting the price
in (21), each SN maximizes its own utility when it reports the
true valuation of the channel gain to the AP. By receiving the
truthful reported channel gains, the AP allocates the power
according to (7) and the social welfare (i.e., sum received
energy of all SNs) is thus maximized.
Remark 2: The price function, e.g. in (14) and (21) are
computed by the mechanism designer. Although the function
is complicated, it is computed in a transparent manner that
is auditable, i.e. SNs can check these after the fact if nec-
essary to ensure its fair application to all participants. In a
practical implementation, SNs can agree to a contract clearly
detailing the mechanism including after-the-fact audit options.
This would give SNs motivation to abide by mechanism
rules, which ensures efficiency and strategy-proofness for all
participants.
D. Downlink Price Function Design With 1-Bit CGR
In this subsection, we discuss a more practical scenario
of 1-bit CGR. After channel training, the SNs have the full
information of their true channel valuation of hn,k but only
feed back 1-bit channel gain b̃n,k to the AP. The design of
the price function is more challenging due to the discrete type
space (b̃n,k ∈ {0, 1}), where it is difficult for the AP to offset
the misreporting incentive based only on the partial reported
channel gain.
1) Failure of VCG Mechanism: We first see if the VCG
mechanism is also applicable to 1-bit CGR. In the absence
of SNn,k, we denote the sum of the 1-bit CGR for the
sector φn by β̂n = βn − b̃n,k. We denote M̂ ≥ 1 as the
number of sectors each with the sum of the CGR equals
β̂(N) = maxi∈ZN{βi=n, β̂n}. For 1-bit CGR, we can obtain
the VCG price similar to (21) and the utility function similar
to (42a)-(42c) by replacing α by β and replacing h̃n,k by
b̃n,kγ. For βn = β(N) and β̂n < β̂(N), the sum of the
reported channel gains in the sector φn is the highest with the
participation of SNn,k and is not the highest in the absence
of SNn,k, which implies b̃n,k = 1. Since βn = β̂n + 1 and
β̂(N) ≤ β(N), we can deduce that β̂(N) = β(N). Under the





τδPtothn,k/M, if βn = β(N)





, if βn = β(N)
and β̂n < β̂(N)
0, if βn < β(N).
(22)
Counterexample of VCG Mechanism: Though truthful
reporting of b̃n,k = bn,k maximizes Un,k in the last two cases
of (22), SNn,k is able to increase its utility Un,k by over-
reporting in the first case. We now give an example to prove
the untruthfulness of VCG for the first case of (22). Consider
M̂ > 1 and 0 < hn,k < γ. By truthfully reporting with
b̃n,k = 0, we have M = M̂ > 1 and the utility of SNn,k is
τδPtothn,k/M . By over-reporting with b̃n,k = 1, the sector
φn becomes the only one sector (i.e., M = 1) that has the
highest value of sum of channel gains among all sectors and
its utility is τδPtothn,k. In this case, SNn,k has the incentive
to cheat since it receives more energy by paying nothing based
on the VCG price.
Remark 3: For 1-bit CGR, the AP designs the power allo-
cation and price functions only based on the partial channel
information which is already distorted from the true valuation
due to quantization. The information is thus severely asymmet-
ric between the AP and the SN. Each sensor has true valuation
of full channel gain but may report the false information of
quantized channel gain. Due to the gap between the achievable
received energy deduced by the AP and the actual energy
received at the SNs, the VCG price may sometimes not big
enough to offset the false reporting incentives of the SNs. The
SNs can take the advantage of this information asymmetry
when choosing their best responses of b̃n,k to maximize their
own utilities. In this case, the VCG mechanism does not
always guarantee the truthfulness and there is still a room
for some SNs to be dishonest.
2) Threshold-Based Price Function: For 1-bit CGR,
we propose a price function based on the channel quantization
threshold in the following theorem.
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Theorem 2: Under the optimal power allocation for down-
link sum energy maximization, the threshold-based price func-
tion of
Cn,k = τδb̃n,kγ (P ∗n − P ∗∗n ) (23)
ensures that truthful-reporting of the 1-bit CGR (i.e., b̃n,k =
bn,k) is the dominant strategy for each SNn,k in P3, where
P ∗n =  (βn = β(N))Ptot/M and P ∗∗n =  (β̂n =
β̂(N))Ptot/M̂ are the optimal power allocated to sector φn
with and without the participation of SNn,k, respectively. And
each SN is individual rational under this threshold-based price.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 4: From Theorem 2, we see that SNn,k pays a non-
zero price if it is the critical SN that changes the optimal power
allocation due to its participation. Different from the VCG
price that depends on the loss of the sum received energy of all
other SNs (except SNn,k), the threshold-based price depends
on the extra achievable energy received by SNn,k. Since the
RF energy on the direction of φn is a non-exclusive and non-
rival public good, we need to subtracts P ∗∗n from P ∗n in (23)
in order to remove the free-riding incentive of SNn,k on other
users. By exploiting the unique property of the quantization
threshold, (23) ensures that truthful reporting is the dominant
strategy of each SN.
Remark 5: To ensure individual rationality of each SN,
the AP under-estimates the utilities of the SNs by using
the lower boundaries of the channel quantization interval
(i.e., 0 and γ) for power allocation and price designs. If the
AP assumes the gains of the SNs according to the middles
of the intervals, i.e., γ/2 and (γ + hmax)/2, it may over-
estimate the welfare of the SNs which channel gains are within
[0, γ/2] or [γ, (γ +hmax)/2] and will thus charge them a high
price accordingly. As such, these SNs may result in negative
utility, which violates the requirement of individual rationality.
IV. TRUTHFUL MECHANISM DESIGN FOR UPLINK
SUM RATE MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we consider the scenario that the SNs harvest
energy from the AP during τ and then use up the harvested
energy to transmit information back to the AP during T − τ
with best effort. We design the dominant-strategy truthful
mechanism for full CGR and 1-bit CGR schemes under the
optimal power allocation for the uplink sum rate maximization.
For each CGR scheme, we first design the price functions to
ensure that truthful CGR is the dominant strategy for each SN.
A. Sum Rate in the Uplink
1) Uplink Information Transfer With Full CGR: After chan-
nel training, each SNn,k obtains hn,k in this fading block
and reports the channel gain h̃n,k back to the AP to aid
the downlink power allocation. By harvesting the energy of
Wn,k(hn,k, Pn(h̃n,k)) from the AP, each SNn,k uses up this
energy to transmit information to the AP in an orthogonal
manner, e.g., TDMA. For full CGR, we divide the information
transfer slot T − τ into Kn sub-slots and allow each SNn,k
to transmit during a sub-slot of (T − τ)/Kn with power of
Wn,k(hn,k, Pn(h̃n,k))Kn/(T − τ). We assume the additive
white Gaussian noise at the AP has zero mean and variance σ.
Since the AP may not fully trust on the reported channel gain
h̃n,k, it adopts non-coherent detection that does not depend on
the knowledge of channel gain. On the other hand, as SNn,k
knows the true channel gain hn,k, it transmits information
with a maximum rate within its channel capacity. Then,
the AP decodes the uplink information using the non-coherent
detection techniques with sophisticated decoders that take the
uplink rate close to the capacity bounds (e.g., see [33] and
the reference therein). Throughout this section, we treat the
uplink rate as an upper bound only, whereas investigating more
sophisticated coding/decoding for characterizing the exact
uplink sum rate is beyond the scope of the current paper, and is
left for future work. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote
the upper bound of uplink rate as uplink rate in the rest of this





























2) Uplink Information Transfer With 1-Bit CGR: For
1-bit CGR, we assume the AP allows only the SNs with
b̃n,k = 1 to transmit in the uplink and excludes the rest of
the SNs from transmitting. For βn number of transmitting
SNs in the sector φn, each SN transmits information in the
uplink over a time duration of (T − τ)/βn with the power
of βnWn,k(hn,k, Pn)/(T − τ). The uplink rate of SNn,k is
b̃n,kRn,k(hn,k, Pn, βn), where b̃n,k indicates whether SNn,k
is allocated a sub-slot for the uplink transmission. From the
AP’s perspective, the achievable uplink sum rate for all SNs
is given by










B. Optimal Power Allocation for Uplink
Sum Rate Maximization
Now we derive the optimal power allocation in the downlink
to maximize the achievable sum rate of all SNs in the uplink







Pn ≤ Ptot (28)
Pn ≥ 0. (29)
Since P5 is a concave optimization problem, there exists a
unique optimal solution for P5.
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1) Optimal Power Allocation With Full CGR: For full
CGR, the optimal power allocation P ∗n(h̃n,k) is a water-
filling solution similar to [2]. The closed-form solution can
be obtained for Kn = 1 and solved numerically for other
cases.
2) Optimal Power Allocation With 1-Bit CGR: The optimal
power allocation for uplink achievable sum rate maximization
with 1-bit CGR is discussed as follows. If βn = 0 ∀n, we have
















= Ptot. The sector φn receives




Since both P ∗n(h̃n,k) and P
∗
n(b̃n,kγ) are non-decreasing
with h̃n,k and b̃n,k, respectively, in the Nash equilibrium,
the reported channel gains for each SNs is h̃∗n,k = hmax
for full CGR and b̃∗n,k = 1 for 1-bit CGR, respectively,
if no price function is used. Similar to the previous section,
the false-reporting in the Nash equilibrium can greatly reduce
the uplink sum rate compared with that of the truthful CGR.
In the following two subsections, we design Cn,k to ensure that
the truthful reporting is the dominant strategy that maximizes
the uplink utility of each SN.
C. Uplink Price Function Design With Full CGR
For full CGR, each SNn,k decides on the optimal reported
channel gain h̃n,k to maximize its own uplink rate under the




Un,k = Rn,k(hn,k, P ∗n(h̃n,k), Kn) − Cn,k (31)
s.t. 0 ≤ h̃n,k ≤ hmax. (32)
We adopt the VCG mechanism to design the price function
Cn,k for the uplink by replacing W by R in (14), where each
SNn,k pays the difference between the maximum achievable
uplink sum rate of all other SNs in the network attributable
to its presence. The optimal power allocation P ∗∗i and P
∗
i
maximize the sum rate maximization without and with the
participation of SNn,k, respectively. Under the VCG price,
we can prove that truthful reporting of h̃∗n,k = hn,k is the
dominant strategy for each SNn,k in P6. The proof is similar
to Appendix A and is omitted here.
As a special case of Ki = 1 for all i ∈ ZN , we denote
SNi,j as SNi and h̃i,j as h̃i. The VCG price becomes























Fig. 3. The externality of SNn on the optimal power allocation in the
system for Kn = 1. (a) SNn has no externality on other SNs if h̃2n ≤ ρλT−τ ;
(b) SNn has negative externality on other SNs if h̃2n >
ρλ
T−τ .
where P ∗i (h̃n) and P
∗∗












. And the Lagrange multipliers















Remark 6: Similar to (14), the VCG price in (33) is the
externality that it imposes on other SNs, which can be reflected
by the reduction of water level due to its participation.
We illustrate this effect of the externality in Fig. 3. If h̃2n ≤
ρλ








In this case, the water level remains the same without and
with the participation of SNn, i.e., T−τν =
T−τ
λ . In this case,
SNn pays zero price Cn = 0 since it causes no externality
on other SNs. If h̃2n >
ρλ
T−τ as shown in Fig. 3(b), SNn
receives non-zero power P ∗n =
T−τ
λ − ρh̃2n > 0 and the water
level reduces from T−τν to
T−τ
λ . The participation of SNn
reduces the received power (if non-zero) of all other SNs,
i.e., P ∗i (h̃n) ≤ P ∗∗i for all i = n. In this case, SNn needs to
pay for the sum rate deduction of all other SNs in the system,
which offsets its over-reporting incentive.
D. Uplink Price Function Design With 1-Bit CGR
For 1-bit CGR, each SNn,k chooses the optimal reporting
strategy b̃n,k to maximize its own utility Un,k under the effi-
cient power allocation P ∗n(b̃n,kγ) and price function Cn,k, i.e.
P7 : max
b̃n,k
Un,k = b̃n,kRn,k(hn,k, P ∗n(b̃n,kγ), βn) − Cn,k
(34)
s.t. b̃n,k ∈ {0, 1}. (35)
To design the price function for the 1-bit CGR, we also face
the challenge that the information is asymmetric between the
AP and the SNs, i.e., the SNs report only partial information
of the channel gain to the AP. We will first prove that VCG
mechanism fails to work, and then propose a threshold-based
price function to ensure the truthfulness is the dominant
strategy for each SN.
1) Failure of VCG: If we adopt VCG mechanism similar to
the previous subsection, the price function of SNn,k with 1-bit
CGR equals to the total change of the sum of achievable rate
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Ri,j(b̃i,jγ, P ∗i (b̃n,kγ), βi). (36)
Counterexample of VCG Mechanism: We now give an
example to show that the VCG mechanism fails to guarantee
the truthfulness of the 1-bit CGR for the uplink sum achievable
rate maximization. Due to the participation of SNn,k, the sum
of the achievable rate of other SNs may change because of
two factors: (1) the change of power allocation across the
sectors; (2) the change of time allocation within the sector
φn. We first ignore the effect of power allocation and focus
on the effect of time allocation by considering βn ≥ 2 and
βi = 0 ∀i = n. Since φn is the only sector with non-zero sum
of reported CGR, the optimal power allocated to the sector
φn without and with the participation of SNn,k is the same,








Rn,j(b̃n,jγ, Ptot, βn). (37)
We assume the true channel indicator of SNn,k is bn,k = 0.
By truthfully reporting with b̃n,k = bn,k = 0, SNn,k is not
allowed to transmit in the uplink and its utility is Un,k = 0.
By over-reporting with b̃n,k = 1, SNn,k is allocated with a
time fraction of (T − τ)/βn to transmit in the uplink and we
have βn = β̂n +1. For other SNs in the sector φn, their uplink
transmission time reduces from (T − τ)/β̂n to (T − τ)/βn,
which thus reduces their uplink rates. Using the VCG price
in (37), the utility function of SNn,k in (34) is rewritten as










































Based on bn,k = 0, we can only deduce that hn,k < γ.
However, if h2n,kβn > γ
2β̂n, the right handside of (38) is
greater than 0 and we have Un,k > 0. In this case, SNn,k
can still improve its own utility by over-reporting. From the
above discussions, we see that VCG mechanism cannot always
guarantee the truthfulness of the 1-bit CGR.
2) Threshold-Based Price Function: In this subsection,
we design a threshold-based price function to guarantee the
truthfulness of the 1-bit CGR from each SN.
Theorem 3: Under the optimal power allocation P ∗n(b̃n,kγ)














ensures that truthful-reporting of 1-bit channel gain (i.e.,
b̃n,k = bn,k) is the dominant strategy of each SNn,k in P7.
Proof: If the true channel indicator of SNn,k is bn,k =
0, it implies hn,k < γ. By truthfully reporting with
b̃n,k = 0, we have Cn,k = 0 and Un,k = 0. By over-





















(the equality holds if P ∗n = 0), which is no better than that
of truthful reporting. If bn,k = 1, it implies that hn,k ≥ γ.




















By under-reporting with b̃n,k = 0, the utility of SNn,k is
Un,k = 0 which is also no better than that of truthful reporting.
We thus prove that the price function in (39) ensures that
truthful reporting is the dominant strategy for each SN.
Remark 7: From Theorem 3, we see that the threshold price
that SNn,k pays the amount of price that equals its own
achievable rate in the uplink. Comparing the two threshold-
based price functions for the downlink in (23) and for the
uplink in (39), we notice that there is no need to subtract
the effect of other SNs in the uplink price since there is no
free-riding effect. Different from the non-exclusive and non-
rival energy transfer in the same energy beam, the information
transmission is exclusive and rival, where each SN is allocated
a dedicated time slot only if it reports b̃n,k = 1. Though
SNn,k with b̃n,k = 0 may also receive free energy from other
co-sector SNs in the downlink, its utility is still zero due to
the lack of transmission slot in the uplink.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the numerical results of the
truthful mechanisms for the two CGR schemes. Without loss
of generality, we consider a simple model with three SNs
in two sectors, i.e., SN1,1 is in the sector φ1, SN2,1 and
SN2,2 are in the sector φ2. We mainly discuss the price
function design for SN2,2. We denote the parameters under
the VCG mechanism and threshold-based mechanism by the
superscripts of VCG and TH. The uplink rate in this section is
measured in nats/s/Hz.
In Fig. 4, we show that the VCG price in Proposition 1 guar-
antees the truthfulness of the full CGR from the SNs under
the optimal power allocation for the downlink sum energy
maximization. In Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), SN2,2 receives higher
energy W2,2 by reporting h̃2,2 ≥ 0.2 than that of h̃2,2 < 0.02.
If there is no price, SN2,2 has the incentive to over-report
its channel gain h̃2,2 in order to increase its received energy.
To offset the over-reporting incentive, the VCG mechanism
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Fig. 4. The truthfulness of the VCG mechanism for the downlink sum energy
maximization with full CGR (h1,1 = 0.04, h2,1 = 0.02, Ptot = 0.1 W,
δ = 1, τ = 1 s). (a) The true valuatoin is h2,2 = 0.01; (b) h2,2 = 0.03.
TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE VCG AND THRESHOLD-BASED
MECHANISMS FOR DOWNLINK SUM ENERGY MAXIMIZATION
WITH 1-BIT CGR (Ptot = 0.1 W, γ = 0.03, b̃1,1 = 1,
b̃2,1 = 1, h2,2 = 0.02, b2,2 = 0, δ = 1, τ = 1 s.
requires SN2,2 to pay the loss of the sum received energy
of SN1,1 and SN2,1 due to its participation. In both figures,
SN2,2 cannot get better off by either over-reporting or under-
reporting. Therefore, it will truthfully report under the VCG
price.
In Table 1, we give an example to show that the threshold-
based price in Theorem 2 ensures the truthfulness of the
1-bit CGR while the VCG price fails under the optimal
power allocation that maximizes the achievable sum energy.
We assume the truthful channel indicator for SN2,2 is b2,2 = 0.
By over-reporting with b̃n,k = 1, SN2,2 receives more energy
of W2,2. We need to see whether the two price functions
can successfully offset this over-reporting incentive. Using the
VCG price, SN2,2 pays zero price regardless of its reported
channel gains so that it gains more utility by over-reporting
than by truthfully reporting. Using the threshold-based price,
SN2,2 pays a positive price of 1.5 if it over-reports with
b̃2,2 = 1 and zero price if it truthfully reports with b̃2,2 = 0.
As a result, the sensor gains higher utility by truthfully
reporting under the threshold-based price.
Fig. 5 illustrates that the VCG price guarantees the truthful-
ness of the full CGR from the SNs under the optimal power
allocation for the uplink sum rate maximization. In Fig. 5(a),
the uplink rate R2,2 increases as the increase of the reported
channel gain h̃2,2, which motivates SN2,2 to over-report.
To compensate the over-reporting incentive, the VCG price
C2,2 also increases with h̃2,2, where the increasing slope of
C2,2 is sharper than that of R2,2 for h̃2,2 > h2,2. As a result,
the maximum value of U2,2 is achieved at the point where
SN2,2 truthfully reports its channel gain, i.e., h̃2,2 = h2,2.
In Fig. 5(b), we further show that truthful reporting is the
Fig. 5. Truthfulness of the VCG mechanism for the uplink sum rate
maximization with full CGR. Consider SN1,1 is in the sector φ1, SN2,1
and SN2,2 are in the sector φ2 (h̃1,1 = 0.02, h̃2,1 = 0.02, Ptot = 0.1 W,
δ = 1, σ = 10−5 W, τ = 1 s, T = 5 s). (a) With full CGR, SN2,2’s uplink
rate R2,2, price function C2,2, and utility function U2,2 versus the SN2,2’s
reported channel gain h̃2,2; (b) SN2,2’s utility function versus the SN2,2’s
reported channel gain h̃2,2 under different true channel gain h2,2.
Fig. 6. Comparison between the VCG and threshold-based mechanisms
for uplink sum rate maximization with 1-bit CGR. Consider SN1,1 is in the
sector φ1, SN2,1 and SN2,2 are in the sector φ2 (h̃1,1 = 0.04, h̃2,1 = 0.04
Ptot = 0.1 W, γ = 0.025, δ = 1, σ = 10−5 W, τ = 1 s, T = 5 s).
(a) h2,2 = 0.03; (b) h2,2 = 0.02.
dominant strategy of SN2,2 that maximizes its uplink utility
for various values of h2,2.
In Fig. 6, we show that the threshold-based price function
in Theorem 3 guarantees the truthfulness of the 1-bit CGR
but the VCG mechanism in (37) is not always truthful under
the optimal power allocation that maximizes the achievable
sum rate. Firstly, we can easily deduce that SN2,2 has zero
utility if it reports b̃2,2 = 0 under either price function,
regardless of its truthful channel valuation. By reporting
b̃2,2 = 1, SN2,2 obtains a positive uplink rate and also pays
a positive price to the AP, where the corresponding VCG
price is CVCG2,2 (b̃2,2 = 1) = 0.25 and threshold-based price
is CTH2,2(b̃2,2 = 1) = 2.24. Next, we discuss whether the two
price functions ensure the truthfulness of the 1-bit CGR. When
the truthful channel indicator of SN2,2 is b2,2 = 1 as shown
in Fig. 6(a), the utility functions are UVCG2,2 (b̃2,2 = 1) = 2.51
and UTH2,2(b̃2,2 = 1) = 0.52, which are both higher than that
of under-reporting with b̃2,2 = 0. In this case, SN2,2 has no
incentive to cheat under either mechanisms. When the truthful
channel indicator is b2,2 = 0 as shown in Fig. 6(b), the utility
functions of SN2,2 under the VCG price and threshold-based
price are UVCG2,2 (b̃2,2 = 1) = 1.43 and UTH2,2(b̃2,2 = 1) = −0.56,
respectively, which is higher than and smaller than that of
the truthful reporting, respectively. In this case, SN2,2 will
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cheat under the VCG price while reporting honestly under the
threshold-based price.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered a harvest-then-transmit direc-
tional WPT system, where the AP allocates the network
resources based on the SNs’ full or binary reported channel
gains. We first derived the AP’s optimal power allocation that
maximizes the social welfare, i.e., downlink sum energy and
the uplink sum rate of all SNs, respectively. Under such power
allocation, we proved that the self-interested SNs have the
incentives to exaggerate their channel gains to increase their
own utilities, which reduces the social welfare compared with
that of the truthful reporting. To align the locally optimal
strategies of the SNs with the maximum social welfare,
we designed the price functions to offset the over-reporting
incentives so that truthful reporting is the dominant strategy
for each SN. Under the full CGR scheme, we derived the price
functions based on the VCG mechanism for the downlink and
uplink, respectively. Under the 1-bit CGR scheme, we first
proved that the VCG mechanism is not truthful and then
proposed the threshold-based price functions for the downlink
and uplink, respectively. Finally, we use numerical results to
further validate the truthfulness of the our mechanism designs.
In the future work, we are working towards generalizing the
mechanism design into the multi-bit channel feedback.
APPENDIX A
As discussed, the optimal power allocated to the sector φi
with and without the participation of SNn,k are given by P ∗i
and P ∗∗i , which are the solutions to P1 and P4, respectively.
Under the VCG price and efficient power allocation, each self-
interested SNn,k chooses the optimal reported channel gain




































Wi,j(h̃i,j , P ∗∗i ). (40)





(h̃i,j , P ∗∗i ) does not depend on h̃n,k. Recall that
P ∗n = arg max
Pn






Wi,j(h̃i,j , Pi(h̃n,k))] which depends on the
reported channel gain h̃n,k. If possible, SNn,k would pick a
reported channel gain h̃n,k that leads the mechanism to pick












The VCG mechanism will choose Pn in a way that solves
the maximization problem in (41) when SNn,k reports
h̃n,k = hn,k. Since this argument does not depend on other
SNs’ strategies, truthful reporting is the dominant strategy for
each SNn,k.
APPENDIX B
By substituting the optimal power allocation in (7) and the




τδPtothn,k/M, if αn =α(N) and α̂n = α̂(N) (42a)
τδPtot
[
(hn,k − h̃n,k)/M − α̂(N) + α(N)
]
,
if αn = α(N)and α̂n < α̂(N) (42b)
0, if αn < α(N). (42c)
Case 1: hn,k + α̂n < α̂(N). 1) Consider SN2 truthfully
reports with h̃n,k = hn,k. In this case, we have αn =
h̃n,k + α̂n = hn,k + α̂n < α(N). According to (42c), we have
Un,k = 0. 2) Consider SN2 over-reports with h̃n,k > hn,k.
If αn = α(N) (with M = 1), we have α̂n = αn −
h̃n,k = α(N) − h̃n,k. According to (42b), we have Un,k =
τδPtot[hn,k − α̂(N) + α(N) − h̃n,k] = τδPtot[hn,k − α̂(N) +
α̂n] < 0, which is worse than that of truthful reporting.
If αn = α(N) (with M ≥ 2), we can easily deduce
that α(N) = α̂(N). According to (42b), we have Un,k =
τδPtot[(hn,k − h̃n,k)/M − α̂(N) + α(N)] = τδPtot(hn,k −
h̃n,k)/M < 0, which is worse than that of truthful reporting.
If αn < α(N), we have Un,k = 0 according to (42c).
3) Consider SN3 under-reports with h̃n,k < hn,k. In this case,
we have αn = h̃n,k + α̂n < hn,k + α̂n < α̂(N) and thus have
αn < α(N). According to (42c), we have Un,k = 0, which is
the same as truthful reporting.
Case 2: hn,k + α̂n ≥ α̂(N) and α̂n < α̂(N). 1) Consider
SNn,k truthfully reports with h̃n,k = hn,k. In this case,
we have αn = h̃n,k + α̂n = hn,k + α̂n ≥ α̂(N) and thus can
deduce that αn = α(N) = h̃n,k + α̂n = hn,k + α̂n. According
to (42b), we have Un,k = τδPtot[(hn,k − h̃n,k)/M + α(N) −
α̂(N)] = τδPtot[α(N)−α̂(N)] = τδPtot[hn,k+α̂n−α̂(N)] ≥ 0.
2) Consider SN2 over-reports with h̃n,k > hn,k. In this case,
we have αn = h̃n,k + α̂n > hn,k + α̂n ≥ α̂(N) and thus
have αn = α(N) (with M = 1) and h̃n,k = α(N) − α̂n.
According to (42b), we have Un,k = τδPtot[hn,k + α(N) −
h̃n,k − α̂(N)] = τδPtot[hn,k + α̂n − α̂(N)] ≥ 0, which is the
same as that of truthful reporting. 3) Consider SN3 under-
reports with h̃n,k < hn,k. If hn,k + α̂n > h̃n,k + α̂n ≥ α̂(N),
Authorized licensed use limited to: Maynooth University Library. Downloaded on February 23,2021 at 17:02:44 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
7978 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 67, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2019
we have αn = α(N) and thus have h̃n,k = α(N) − α̂n.
Since M ≥ 1 and hn,k − h̃n,k > 0, we have Un,k =
τδPtot[(hn,k − h̃n,k)/M − α̂(N) + α(N)] ≤ τδPtot[hn,k −
h̃n,k − α̂(N) + α(N)] = τδPtot[hn,k + α̂n − α̂(N)]. In this
case, under-reporting is worse than or at most equivalent to
truthful reporting. If hn,k + α̂n ≥ α̂(N) > h̃n,k + α̂n, we have
αn = h̃n,k + α̂n < α̂(N) ≤ α(N). According to (42c), we have
Un,k = 0 which is worse than that of truthful reporting.
Case 3: hn,k + α̂n ≥ α̂(N) and α̂n = α̂(N). In this case,
we can deduce that αn = α(N). According to (42a), we have
Un,k = τδPtothn,k/M for any reported channel gain of h̃n,k.
From the above discussions, we see that SNn,k cannot
get better off by either over-reporting or under-reporting,
regardless of other SNs’ reporting strategies. Therefore, truth-
ful reporting is the weakly dominant strategy for each SN.
Furthermore, the individual rational holds as the utility of a
truthful SN is always non-negative under its dominant strategy.
If an SN does not participate in the game, it is equivalent to
under-reporting h̃n,k = 0, where the SN will have less utility
than truthful reporting.
APPENDIX C





n − b̃n,kγ (P ∗n − P ∗∗n )
]
. (43)
Denote Δ = P ∗n − P ∗∗n , it can be easily proved that Δ ≥ 0.
Substituting Δ into (43), we have
Un,k = τδ
[













If bn,k = 0, we have hn,k < γ. By truthfully reporting
with b̃n,k = 0, we have P ∗n = P
∗∗
n and its utility in (43)
is Un,k = τδhn,kP ∗n = τδhn,kP ∗∗n . By over-reporting with















which is worse than that of truthful reporting.
If bn,k = 1, we have hn,k ≥ γ. By truthfully reporting with











≥ τδhn,kP ∗∗n .
(46)
By under-reporting with b̃n,k = 0, we have P ∗n = P
∗∗
n and its
utility in (43) is Un,k = τδhn,kP ∗n = τδhn,kP
∗∗
n which is no
better than of truthful reporting.
To sum up, adopting the price function in (23), SNn,k cannot
improve its utility by deviating from the truthful reporting,
regardless of other SNs’ reporting strategies. We thus proved
that the truthful reporting is the dominant strategy for each SN.
Each SN is individual rational as it always has non-negative
utility under its dominant strategy. If an SN does not partici-
pate in the game, it is equivalent to under-reporting b̃n,k = 0,
where the SN will have less utility than truthful reporting.
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